The central insight of asset pricing is that a security's value depends on both its distribution of payo¤s across economic states and state prices. In …xed income markets, many investors focus exclusively on estimates of expected payo¤s, such as credit ratings, without considering the state of the economy in which default is likely to occur. Such investors are likely to be attracted to securities whose payo¤s resemble those of economic catastrophe bonds-bonds that default only under severe economic conditions. We show that many structured …nance instruments can be characterized as economic catastrophe bonds, but o¤er far less compensation than alternatives with comparable payo¤ pro…les. We argue that this di¤erence arises from the willingness of rating agencies to certify structured products with a low default likelihood as "safe" and from a large supply of investors who view them as such.
This paper investigates the pricing and risks of instruments created as a result of recent structured …nance activities. Pooling economic assets into large portfolios and tranching them into sequential cash ‡ow claims has become a big business, generating record pro…ts for both the Wall Street originators and the agencies that rate these securities. A typical tranching scheme involves prioritizing the cash ‡ows (liabilities) of the underlying collateral pool, such that a senior claim su¤ers losses only after the principal of the subordinate tranches has been exhausted. This prioritization rule allows senior tranches to have low default probabilities and garner high credit ratings. However, it also con…nes senior tranche losses to systematically bad economic states, e¤ectively creating economic catastrophe bonds.
The fundamental asset pricing insight of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) is that an asset's value is determined by both its distribution of payo¤s across economic states and state prices.
Securities that fail to deliver their promised payments in the "worst" economic states will have low values, because these are precisely the states where a dollar is most valuable. Consequently, securities resembling economic catastrophe bonds should o¤er a large risk premium to compensate for their systematic risk.
Interestingly, we …nd that securities manufactured to resemble economic catastrophe bonds have relatively high prices, similar to those of single name securities with identical credit ratings. Credit ratings describe a security's expected payo¤s in the form of its default likelihood and anticipated recovery value given default. However, because they contain no information about the state of the economy in which default occurs, they are insu¢ cient for pricing. Nonetheless, in practice, many investors rely heavily upon credit ratings for pricing and risk assessment of credit sensitive securities, with large amounts of insurance and pension fund capital explicitly restricted to owning highly rated securities. In light of this behavior, the manufacturing of securities resembling economic catastrophe bonds emerges as the optimal mechanism for exploiting investors who rely on ratings for pricing. These securities will be the cheapest to supply to investors demanding a given rating, but will trade at too high a price if valued based on rating-matched alternatives as opposed to proper risk-matched alternatives.
To study the risk properties of manufactured credit securities, we develop a simple statecontingent pricing framework. In the spirit of the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) CAPM, we use the realized market return as the relevant state space for asset pricing. This allows us to extract state prices from market index options using the technique of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) .
Index options are essentially bets on whether the index value at maturity will be above or below a prespeci…ed level. When appropriately combined, they can be used to price a bet that pays one if the index closes at a given value and zero otherwise, and thus represent the Arrow-Debreu state price for that particular market realization. To obtain state-contingent payo¤s, we employ a modi…ed version of the Merton (1974) structural credit model, in which asset values are driven by a common market factor. This allows us to compute the payo¤s of the underlying asset pool as a function of the realized market return. Since the tranches are derivatives written on the pool, their state-contingent payo¤s can be determined simply by applying their contractual terms to the payo¤s of the pool. Finally, to price the asset pool and its derivatives, we scale the mean statecontingent payo¤s by the corresponding option-implied state prices. An attractive feature of this framework is that relying on the market state space preserves economic intuition throughout the pricing exercise, in contrast to popular statistics-heavy methods. The framework is assembled from classic insights on well developed markets, allowing the risks and prices of various securities to be consistently compared across markets.
One of the well-documented weaknesses of structural credit models is that their reliance on lognormally-distributed asset values poses di¢ culty in pricing securities with low likelihoods of default. Because we use the structural approach solely to characterize default probabilities conditional on the realization of the market return, we only require the conditional distribution of asset values to be lognormal, while remaining agnostic about the distribution of the market factor. This seemingly minor modi…cation has a signi…cant impact. Using the state price density extracted from index options, we are easily able to calibrate the structural model to match the empirically observed credit yield spread for a broad credit default swap index (CDX). The resulting parameters are intuitive and stable through time. We also show that the replicating yield spread and the actual yield spread have similar dynamics, suggesting that the index options and corporate bond markets are reasonably integrated. Speci…cally, the pricing model explains roughly 30% of the variation in weekly credit spread changes of the CDX, which compares favorably to existing ad hoc speci…cations.
Remarkably, at the same time, we …nd that the market prices of senior CDX tranches are signi…cantly higher than their risk-matched alternatives. We estimate that an investor who purchases a AAA-rated tranche of the CDX could earn a yield spread four to …ve times larger by bearing comparable economic risks in the index options market. Over the period from 2004 through 2007, spreads of senior CDX tranches are highly similar to those of equivalently rated single name corporate bonds, suggesting that investors indeed viewed these to be the proper benchmark even though their underlying economic risks are highly dissimilar. the prioritization of the claims causes the defaults of more senior claims to, on average, be associated with progressively worse economic outcomes. This is re ‡ected by high ratios of yield spreads to expected loss rates for highly rated corporate bonds (Elton, et al. (2001) , Driessen (2003) , Hull, et al. (2005) ).
The tranching of portfolios composed of securities that already have a tendency to concentrate risks in bad economic states, further concentrates these risks. We show that losses on the most senior tranches referencing an index of investment grade credit default swaps are largely con…ned to the worst economic states, suggesting that they should trade at signi…cantly higher yield spreads than single-name bonds with identical credit ratings. Surprisingly, this implication turns out not to be supported by the data.
In order to examine the impact of pooling and tranching on asset prices, the next section introduces a conceptual model of credit securities in the spirit of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) .
This model is then adapted in Section 2, into a form that is suitable for calibration to market data, allowing us to explore the pricing of structured …nance securities in actual credit markets.
The Economic Setting
In order to explore the pricing of derivatives referencing pools of risky bonds, common in structured …nance, we …rst need to pre-specify the set of possible economic outcomes. Since riskaverse investors will be willing to pay more for securities that pay o¤ in states where marginal utility of one dollar is high, it is natural to order the economic states, s, in order of declining marginal utility. In what follows, we assume that s entirely captures the set of states in the economy that are relevant to investors, providing an indexing of states from most adverse (recession) to most favorable (boom). In this economic setting -…rst introduced by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) -the challenge of pricing assets boils down to specifying their state-contingent payo¤s.
Since a typical risky bond is issued by a …rm, whose cash ‡ows -and consequently, ability to repay -are positively related to economic outcomes, it is also natural to assume that risky bonds are economic assets, and their payo¤s are positively exposed to the economy's outcomes. 1 To keep matters simple, we assume that at maturity, periods into the future, each bond will either pay one, or with some probability, p D (s); default and pay zero. The economic nature of the risky bonds is captured by allowing the individual securities'default probabilities to be related to the economic state, s. In particular, we assume that each asset's default risk is a declining function of s, such that the bonds are more likely to default in recessions than in booms @p D (s) @s < 0 . Finally, we denote the probability of a given state s occurring by (s).
In practice, the default risks of credit sensitive securities -risky bonds and tranches alike -are frequently assessed by government-certi…ed credit rating agencies. These agencies (e.g. Moody's, S&P, Fitch, etc.) assign alphanumeric ratings to securities on the basis of their unconditional default probabilities or expected losses. 2 The attention paid by investors to credit ratings often compels issuers to target a desired rating and therefore issue claims with a speci…c level of default risk. Consequently, the comparative statics of our pricing analysis will typically hold the credit rating -as proxied by the unconditional default probability -of the securities under consideration …xed.
Characterizing Tranche Prices
To develop intuition for how structured …nance activities impact the state-contingent payo¤s and prices of the derivative claims, we begin by considering a tranche referencing an asset pool with a notional value of $1, consisting of N homogeneous and equally-weighted risky bonds. The simplest possible tranche, called a digital tranche, is one that o¤ers a payo¤ of one if the portfolio payo¤ exceeds the value of 1 X and zero otherwise. The value X is referred to as a loss attachment point, since it speci…es the maximal percentage loss on the underlying portfolio for which the tranche continues to make its contractual payments. 3 It can be thought of as the amount of protection or "overcollateralization" provided to the claim by the prioritized payout structure.
If the defaults in the underlying asset portfolio are independent given the realization of the economic state, s, the number of defaulted securities in the underlying portfolio in a given state will have a binomial distribution, with parameter p D (s) and N trials. In practice, the underlying asset pools are quite large and the state-contingent default probabilities on the individual assets su¢ ciently high, such that the binomial distribution will be well approximated by a normal distribution with mean, N p D (s), and variance, N p D (s) (1 p D (s)). 4 This distributional approximation has the added convenience that it allows us to treat N as a continuous variable, and simpli…es a number of the ensuing derivations without any loss of intuition. Although the ensuing results will hold under more general conditions, in the next section we formally relax this assumption to ensure that it does not quantitatively in ‡uence our empirical results. Using this approximation, the state-contingent probability of observing the tranche default, p X D (s), given by the probability that the losses on the underlying portfolio exceed the attachment point, X, is
where ( ) is the cumulative normal distribution. Figure 1 illustrates the state-contingent tranche payo¤, given by 1 p X D (s), and shows that -holding X …xed -increasing the number of securities in the underlying portfolio shifts payo¤s from states with high marginal utility, to states with low 2 In the simpli…ed setting in this section, the recovery value in default is set to zero and therefore the unconditional default probability and expected loss coincide. 3 In real-world credit market settings, to which we turn in the next section, tranches are de…ned by a lower (X) and upper (Y ) attachment point, such that the tranche pays one if the portfolio loses less than X, zero if it loses more than Y , and a linearly scaled payo¤ if the portfolio loss is between X and Y . 4 This approximation can also be interpreted as saying that within a given state, s, the percentage portfolio losses are normally distributed with mean, pD(s), and variance,
. Although the normal distribution counterfactually allows for negative losses, the likelihood of such draws shrinks dramatically with N . marginal utility. However, as N increases, the unconditional tranche default probability will also vary, causing the tranche's credit rating to change.
The unconditional tranche default probability can be computed from:
From this, it is easy to see that the claim's default probability is declining in the amount of overcollateralization, X. Less obvious is how the default likelihood is impacted by N . In particular, for states s < p 1 D (X), the state-contingent probability of observing a tranche fail is increasing in N , while for states s > p 1 D (X), it is decreasing in N . The net e¤ect of a change in the number of underlying securities on the unconditional tranche default probability, p X D , will therefore depend not only on the magnitudes of the derivatives in the two regions of the state space, but also on the relative likelihoods of observing economic outcomes in these two regions. Intuitively, for senior tranches -characterized by large values of X -the likelihood of observing economic states in which default occurs is likely to be su¢ ciently low, such that the second e¤ect dominates, and an increase in N results in a decrease in the unconditional probability of default, p X D . More central to our purposes is the question of how increasing the size of the asset pool, N -a proxy for the level of diversi…cation -changes the price of a tranche, when the unconditional default probability is …xed at some level p , i.e. when the tranche's credit rating is held …xed. Using the state-contingent pricing method of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) , if the value of one unit of wealth in state s is given by q(s) -the Arrow-Debreu price for state s -the price of any asset can be obtained by summing the expected state-contingent payo¤s multiplied by their corresponding state prices. For example, the price of each -period risky bond in the underlying portfolio can be obtained from
A derivative claim, or tranche, against an underlying asset pool that is structured to achieve a certain level of default risk can be priced in an equivalent manner. In particular, if we de…ne X(p ; N ) as the loss attachment point that produces a digital tranche with default risk, p X D equal to p , when the underlying portfolio is comprised of N bonds, the price of the claim with periods to maturity can be computed from
By analogy to the bond example, the …rst term in the integral represents the expected statecontingent tranche payo¤ and is equal to one minus the state-contingent tranche default probability,
(s); and the second term represents the corresponding state price. By varying the tranche attachment point, X, one can form an entire sequence of tranches, indexed by N , whose unconditional default probability is held …xed at p . This attachment point is denoted by X(p ; N ). We show that the values of the tranches in this sequence have the following property.
Proposition 1 Holding the unconditional default probability constant at p , the value of a digital tranche, B X(p ;N ) , declines as the number of securities in the underlying bond portfolio, N , increases.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition underlying Proposition 1 is that increasing N , while targeting a …xed level of default risk, reallocates payo¤s from states with high marginal utility (recessions) to states with low marginal utility (booms). Consequently, despite having an unaltered credit rating, the securities in the sequence o¤er progressively less protection against economic catastrophe. In order to bear this increased level of systematic risk, the marginal investor demands additional compensation, causing the tranche price to fall.
Cheapest to Supply
In practice, investors are often interested in targeting a given credit rating for the securities in their portfolio, say corresponding to some unconditional default probability, p . In light of the above discussion, which indicates that securities with the same default risk can trade at di¤erent prices, it is worth considering what would be the least expensive security that could be supplied to this investor, while satisfying his default risk target. Using the state-contingent pricing framework, one can show that within the set of discount bonds with an unconditional expected payo¤ of 1 p , the bond with the lowest price (i.e. the largest yield spread), 5 will congregate the likelihood of default in the worst economic states possible. We refer to this security as the cheapest to supply.
Proposition 2 (CHEAPEST TO SUPPLY)
The cheapest security to supply with an unconditional expected payo¤ of 1 p pays zero on a set with measure p containing the worst economic states, and one elsewhere.
For example, if we were to order economic states, s, by the corresponding realization of the market return, the cheapest to supply bond would correspond to a digital call option on the market, with a strike price set at the p -th percentile of the -period market value distribution. At maturity, this simple call option delivers a payment of zero if the market value is in the bottom p percent of the anticipated realizations and one otherwise.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the payo¤s of the digital tranche studied above increasingly resemble a digital call option as N becomes large. To see this, notice that in the limiting case of perfect diversi…cation, the state-contingent portfolio payo¤ converges in probability to its mean, 1 p D (s).
In turn, a tranche with a loss-attachment point of X only defaults if the realized economic state is below a critical thresholds, where p D (s) = X. Thus, if we target default risk p , the payo¤ of the tranche referencing a fully diversi…ed portfolio of economic assets converges to the payo¤ of the cheapest asset to supply with an unconditional default probability of p .
Proposition 3
For any desired probability of default p , the cheapest asset to supply with that probability of default can be constructed by issuing a tranche with a loss attachment point of X(p ; 1)
against an asymptotically diversi…ed collateral pool (N ! 1). If the cumulative distribution of economic states is given by (s), the attachment point of the limiting tranche is given by, p D ( 1 (p )).
Finally, suppose the tranche was constructed to have the same unconditional default probability as the bonds in the underlying portfolio. In this case, the expected losses on the tranche and underlying portfolio are identical, and the two securities would command identical ratings. However, as N increases, the tranche converges to the cheapest asset to supply, causing it to trade at a yield spread that is greater than the yield spread on the underlying bond portfolio. This emerges vividly in Figure 2 , which compares the payo¤s of a bond portfolio and a digital tranche that have been constructed to have the same expected loss, as a function of the state of the economy. As we can see, relative to the underlying bond portfolio, the tranche has greater payo¤s in good states (booms) and lower payo¤s in bad states (recessions). Consequently, pooling and tranching emerges as a convenient method for altering the economic risk of the underlying securities, and, in particular, for manufacturing securities o¤ering high yields relative to their default likelihoods. Investors who fail to appreciate the ability of pooling and tranching to reallocate payo¤s across economic states of nature, may be attracted to the high yields o¤ered by structured …nance securities, without appreciating these securities'increased systematic risk.
Pricing CDO Tranches
One of the most widely issued structured instruments is the collateralized debt obligation or CDO. A CDO allows its originator to issue a prioritized capital structure of derivative claims against the underlying collateral pool. In a typical CDO, the underlying pool is either comprised of a portfolio of risky bonds (cash CDO) or credit default swaps (synthetic CDO), which can be thought of as default insurance contracts. 6 we need a model to specify both the form of the state-contingent default probability, p D (s), and the state-contingent expected recovery rate, which will generally be di¤erent from zero. To do this, we modify Merton's (1974) structural model of debt by imposing a factor structure on the asset returns of the …rms issuing debt. 7 Speci…cally, we assume asset returns satisfy a CAPMstyle relation, which allows us to derive state-contingent expectations of the bond and tranche payo¤s for all realizations of the market return. By allowing the …rms'asset value processes to be correlated through the common market factor we are also able to capture their common exposure to macroeconomic conditions and introduce default correlation, which plays a key role in determining the distribution of losses on the underlying bond portfolio. 8 Importantly, since we only rely on the model to produce payo¤s conditional on the realization of the market return, we are able to remain agnostic about the distribution of the common factor. This represents a signi…cant departure from existing single-factor models (Vasicek (1987 (Vasicek ( , 1991 , Schönbucher (2000) , Hull, Predescu and White (2006)), which make restrictive assumptions about the distribution of the common factor in order to derive closed-form expressions. 9 Furthermore, because these models are estimated exclusively under the risk-neutral (i.e. pricing) measure, they obscure the important distinction between expected payo¤s and risk premia, which can be transparently analyzed in our state-contingent valuation approach.
Finally, to value bond and CDO tranche payo¤s we apply state prices extracted from equity index options. By using option-implied state prices, we achieve two important objectives. First, we ensure that we correctly capture the forward-looking distribution of the market return, which is likely to di¤er from the distributional assumptions commonly used in analytical models (Gaussian, student-t, etc). 10 And, second, we capture the risk premia investors demand for assets which fail to pay o¤ in adverse economic states, when the marginal utility of $1 is high. 7 See Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) and references therein, for a comprehensive survey of structural models. 8 Zhou (2001) examines the ability of structural models to capture default correlations through asset correlations. 9 The Vasicek model, with its normally distributed market factor, gives rise to a Gaussian copula for defaults, and is the basis of a common market quoting convention for CDO tranche prices, known as implied correlation.
1 0 Since our model relies on option prices to characterize the distribution of the common factor under the pricing measure, it can also be thought of as an option-implied copula model.
Integrating Merton' s (1974) Credit Model with the CAPM
In Merton's model, a …rm is assumed to default on its debt if the terminal value of its assets, A i;T , falls below the face value of its debt, D i . 11 Formally, since our goal is to model the expected payo¤s for the portfolio of risky debt underlying the collateralized debt obligation (CDO), we would need to write down a separate model for each of the N …rms, whose debt is in the reference portfolio. In order to avoid this complication, we instead make the simplifying assumption that the bonds in the portfolio were issued by N identical …rms (homogenous portfolio assumption). Consequently, our model parameters are best thought of as characterizing the representative …rm in the underlying portfolio. In turn, as in Merton's (1974) structural model, the representative …rm will be characterized by a triple of parameters: the expected rate of return on its assets, which will be captured by the beta of its assets, a , the …rm's debt-to-asset ratio, D At , and the volatility of its assets, a .
In order to obtain bond payo¤s conditional on the realization of the market return, suitable for use in our state-contingent valuation method, we modify Merton's (1974) model by imposing a factor structure on the asset returns. Speci…cally, we assume that asset returns are driven by a combination of innovations to a market factor,Z m , and idiosyncratic shocks,Z i;" . Importantly, since we only rely on the structural model to produce conditional payo¤s, we leave the distribution of the market factor unspeci…ed at this stage, allowing asset returns to have arbitrary, non-Gaussian unconditional distributions. Only conditional on the realization of the common factor, do we assume that asset returns are Gaussian (i.e.Z i;" is normally distributed). Moreover, when writing down the returns for the …rm's assets and the market, we focus on a simple, one-period model set in discrete-time, since defaults can only occur at maturity, T . If we note by , the time remaining to maturity, T t, the (log) asset and market returns are assumed to be given by:
where: r f denotes the riskless rate, a is the asset risk premium, a is the asset CAPM beta and " is the idiosyncratic asset volatility, m is the market dividend yield, m is the equity market risk premium and m is the market volatility. Finally, the total asset volatility, a , is given by, q 2 . Since we are interested in deriving bond payo¤s conditional on the realization of the common market factor, we will primarily be working with the conditional distribution of the terminal value ofÃ i;T . If we de…ne the log moneyness,m , as the logarithm of the ratio of the terminal market index level,M T , to the time t futures price, M t exp ((r f m ) )), one can show that the terminal asset value,Ã i;T , conditional on terminal moneyness equaling m , is a random variable given by:
Therefore the probability of a …rm i defaulting on its debt conditional on the realization of m , which is given by the probability thatÃ i;T (m ) < D, is:
where we have de…ned, (m ) -the distance to default conditional on the realization of m -as,
Unlike actuarial claims, whose default probability is unrelated to the economic state ( = 0), bonds are economic assets and have positive CAPM betas ( > 0). Consequently, their conditional probability of default increases in the adversity of the economic state (
To derive an expression for the random, state-contingent bond portfolio payo¤, we still have to specify a recovery value for any bonds that might have defaulted. In Merton's (1974) structural model, the payo¤ of a defaulted bond is naturally determined by the terminal value of the assets,
However, it is now well-known that calibrated structural models generally imply counterfactually high unconditional recovery rates. Consequently, it is common to assume that a fraction, , of the terminal asset value is lost to bankruptcy costs (Leland (1994) ). For example, in order to …t the data, Cremers et al. (2007) need bankruptcy costs to be approximately equal to 50% of the terminal asset value. 13 With this auxiliary assumption, the random state-contingent payo¤ of an equally-weighted portfolio of N bonds -expressed as a fraction of the par value of the underlying bonds -is given by,
is an indicator variable that -given the realization ofm -takes the value of one if bond i has defaulted, and zero otherwise.
To price the bond portfolio we need to compute its expected state-contingent payo¤s and integrate them against the state prices extracted from equity index options. Since we have assumed that our portfolio consists of a homogeneous set of bonds, they will have identical state-contingent default probabilities and expected recovery rates. We therefore drop the i subscripts, and write the expected state-contingent bond portfolio payo¤ as
where p D (m ) is the state-contingent default probability given in (8) , and the expectation term re ‡ects the conditional expectation of the terminal value of assets for a …rm that has defaulted on its debt. 14 The conditional expectation of a defaulted …rm's terminal asset value is the mean of a truncated lognormal random variable and is equal to,
According to the above formula, the terminal asset value -which determines the ultimate bond recovery rate -is an increasing function of the market return, capturing the procyclical nature of recovery rates reported in the literature (Altman (2006)).
Finally, to price the underlying bond portfolio we apply the Arrow-Debreu valuation technique to its state-contingent payo¤s. Since our state space is de…ned with respect to the realizations of the market factor, state prices can be readily computed from observations of equity index option values. In particular, Breeden and Lizenberger (1978) show that state prices can be extracted from European call option prices by taking the second derivative of the call price with respect to the strike at di¤erent moneyness levels. By integrating the product of the conditional expected portfolio payo¤ and the corresponding state price, q(m ), across all realizations of the market return, we arrive at the price (value) of the risky bond portfolio, V : 
Conceptually, in order to obtain the corresponding prices for the tranches, V [X;Y ] , one proceeds in the same way as in the case of the underlying portfolio, by …rst computing the expected state-contingent payo¤s and then integrating them against the state prices, as in (13) . However, in the case of the tranches the expected state-contingent payo¤s are di¢ cult to compute analytically because of the complexity ofP (m ) and the non-linearity of the tranche payo¤ function, (14) . Consequently, it is necessary to resort to numerical methods in order to evaluate the payo¤ expectation appearing in the pricing integral. In practice, the expected state-contingent tranche payo¤ can be obtained with little computational e¤ort, by simulating the conditional payo¤s of the underlying bond portfolio and applying the tranche contract terms.
Data Description
Our empirical analysis relies on two main sets of data. The …rst consists of daily spreads of and a payo¤ that is linearly adjusted for CDX losses between 7% and 10%. As with CDSs, the tranche prices are quoted in terms of the running spreads that a buyer of protection would have to pay in order to insure the tranche payo¤. 16 In the case of tranches, the protection buyer pays the 2003), and references therein. 1 6 Formally, the market quoting convention for the 0-3 tranche is to quote an up-front payment to be received by the protection seller at the initiation of the contract, in addition to a …xed running spread of 500bps. In order to make the 0-3 tranche price series comparable to the remaining tranches, we convert the up-front payment into an equivalent running spread. running spread only on the surviving tranche notional on each date. Consequently, if the portfolio losses exceed the tranche's upper attachment point, the protection buyer ceases to make payments to the protection seller.
In practice, the composition of the CDX index is refreshed every March and September to re ‡ect changes in the composition of the liquid investment grade bond universe. In turn, each new version of the CDX, referenced by a series number, remains "on-the-run"for six months after the roll date.
Since the majority of market activity is concentrated in the on-the-run series, we splice the …rst six months of Series 3 through Series 8 of the CDX NA IG to produce a continuous series of on-the-run spreads over the three-year period, as in Longsta¤ and Rajan (2007) . For contextual reference, we compare the CDX and tranche credit spreads to daily series of average corporate bond spreads on AA, A, BBB, BB, and B-rated bonds. These spreads are reported in terms of an equivalent 5-year CDS spread implied by corporate bond prices.
Finally, our analysis also requires accurate prices for out-of-the-money market put options in order to construct state prices for use in valuation. To match the timing of the CDX payo¤, we require put options that have …ve years to maturity. Unfortunately, during our sample period, no index options with maturity exceeding three years traded on centralized exchanges. Instead we rely on daily over-the-counter quotes on …ve-year S&P 500 options obtained from Citigroup. These quotes correspond to 13 securities with standardized moneyness levels ranging from 0.70 (30% out-of-the-money) to 1.30 (30% in-the-money) at increments of 5%, allowing us to …t an implied volatility function for long-dated options on each day. 17 Table 1 spreads, suggesting that market volatility is a key factor in the pricing of credit-sensitive corporate securities. 18 The correlation between changes in long-term volatility and the changes in the CDX and the tranche spreads is somewhat larger. 1 7 An option's moneyness is de…ned as
Summary Statistics
, where K is the option strike price and Ft; is the contemporaneous -year ( = 5) futures price on the S&P 500 index. 1 8 Pan and Singleton (2006) …nd that sovereign credit default swap spreads move with measures of aggregate volatility.
Calibrating the Bond Pricing Model
A seller of protection on the CDX is e¤ectively committing to bearing the losses on the underlying portfolio of risky debt in exchange for receiving periodic spread payments. In order for no payments to exchange hands at contract initiation, the quoted CDX spread is set such that the present value of the spread payments to be made over the life of the contract by the protection buyer (premium leg) is exactly equal to the present value of the expected losses to be borne by the protection seller (protection leg). Consequently, while our ultimate goal is to match the observed CDX spread, the above relationship allows us to focus on modeling the present value of expected losses, which we then convert into an equivalent running spread. The present value of the losses, however, is simply given by the wedge between the value of a riskless debt portfolio and the risky debt portfolio underlying the CDX, V , which can be priced using the model in Section 2.
In order to price the underlying risky debt portfolio referenced by the credit default swaps in the CDX, we adopt a simple state-contingent valuation approach. In particular, we use the structural model in Section 2 to produce the expected state-contingent payo¤s for the underling portfolio, (11), which we then value using an empirical estimate of the state prices obtained from 5-year index options, as in (13) . In other words, we project the payo¤s on the risky debt into the space of market returns using the structural model, and then use Arrow-Debreu prices to arrive at the price of the risky debt portfolio. The price is then converted into an equivalent spread that would be paid by an agent seeking to insure the portfolio against potential losses.
To simplify the calibration procedure we make the auxiliary assumption that the risky bond portfolio underlying the CDX is homogenous, i.e. it is comprised of bonds issued by N identical …rms. Consequently, rather than estimate a triple of parameters -the …rm leverage ratio, D At , the …rm's idiosyncratic asset volatility, " , and the …rm's asset beta, a -for each …rm in the pool, we only estimate one set of parameter values, which are best thought of as characterizing a representative …rm in the index. On each day, to pin down the three parameters, we require that the following three constraints be satis…ed: (1) the model-implied CDX running spread matches the empirically observed running spread; (2) the model-implied equity beta of the …rm is equal to ; and, (3) the model-implied pairwise equity return correlation is equal to .
An implicit assumption of this calibration procedure, consistent with industry practice, is that the CDX spread re ‡ects the risk-adjusted compensation for the expected loss given default, and is una¤ected by tax or liquidity considerations. Indeed, Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005) argue that a lack of supply constraints, the ease of entering and exiting credit default swap arrangements, and the contractual nature of the swaps, ensure that the market is less sensitive to liquidity and convenience yield e¤ects than the corporate bond market.
The two ingredients of our model calibration are the state-contingent payo¤ function -parameterized by ( D At ; " ; a ) -and the option-implied state prices. If the structural model correctly captures the risk characteristics of the underlying portfolio, the calibrated set of parameter values should allow us to not only match the level of the CDX on a given day with sensible parameter values, but also help explain variation in the CDX spread as state prices change. To verify the robustness of our model along these lines, we perform a variety of checks. First, we compare the performance of two parametric implied volatility functions used in constructing the state price density. Second, we evaluate the performance of two recovery rate assumptions. Third, we show that our calibration procedure allows us to obtain high R 2 in forecasting CDX yield changes at various frequencies, for various combinations of implied volatility speci…cations and recovery assumptions.
This ensures that the state-contingent replicating portfolio implied by the structural model shares the risk characteristics of the CDX index. We then show how the calibrated model can be used to price tranches, as well as, inform the construction of simple replicating strategies involving put spreads on the market index.
Extracting State Prices
In order to value the state-contingent bond portfolio payo¤s produced using model in Section 2, we need a complete set of state prices as a function of the realized -period market return, q(m ).
As before, we identify states by their (log) moneyness, which is de…ned as the log ratio of terminal market value, M t+ , to the -period futures price at time t,
To extract state prices on this grid we exploit the fact that the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities can be recovered from options data. In particular, Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) have shown that -given the market prices of European call options with -periods to maturity and strike prices K, C(K; ) -the price of an Arrow-Debreu security for state m is equal to the second derivative of the call price function with respect to the strike price. Consequently, the state price for state m can be computed from,
where x = exp(m ) denotes the corresponding moneyness level. The formula for the Arrow-Debreu prices is particularly simple when the underlying asset follows a log-normal di¤usion. However, as is now well established, index options exhibit a pronounced volatility smile, which suggests that deep out-of-the-money states are more expensive than would be suggested by a simple lognormal di¤usion model. To account for this, we derive the analog of the Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) result in the presence of a volatility smile. Speci…cally, if we express option prices, C(K; ), using the Black-Scholes formula and allow implied volatility to be a function of the strike price, C BS (K; (K; ); ), we obtain,
For any twice-di¤erentiable implied volatility function, (K; ), the price of the corresponding Arrow-Debreu securities can be computed in closed-form using the above expression. Consistent with intuition, the state prices depend on the slope and curvature of the implied volatility smile, as well as the cross-partial e¤ect of changes in the strike on option value. When the implied volatility function is ‡at -as would be the case when the underlying asset follows a log-normal di¤usion -only the …rst term remains.
Since any twice-di¤erentiable implied volatility function implies a set of Arrow-Debreu prices, the challenge of computing state prices e¤ectively boils down to …tting an implied volatility function to the empirical option data. Of course, since we only have observations for a discrete set of options with moneyness values from 0.7 to 1.3, we are forced to both interpolate and extrapolate the implied volatility function. Typical parametric approaches to this problem involve …tting linear combinations of orthogonal polynomials (Rosenberg and Engle (2001)) or splines (Bliss and Panigirtzoglu (2004)). 19 Instead, we take a more direct route, and propose a few parsimoniously parameterized implied volatility functions, which produce strictly positive implied volatilities, have controllable behavior in the tails, and are twice di¤erentiable (see Appendix B for details). Our preferred speci…cation is based on the hyperbolic tangent function and takes the form: The ability to construct a set of Arrow-Debreu prices spanning all possible realizations of m , even those for which we do not have empirical option data, is crucial to our analysis. The key concern is that our parametric implied volatility function may over-estimate the state-prices associated with bad economic states, which would then overstate our estimates of the required risk compensation for the CDX tranches. To mitigate this possibility, we also constrain the implied volatility function to have a maximum implied volatility equal to the maximum implied volatility observed among the option prices for which we have data. This essentially amounts to ‡attening the implied volatility skew between moneyness of 0 and 0.7 at the level observed at moneyness of 0.7. This alters the state price density so that the pricing errors associated with the observed options are somewhat larger, 20 but with the bene…t of producing conservative deep out-of-the-money state prices that can be used to evaluate the robustness of our tranche prices. We refer to model speci…cations using this constrained state price density as having a "constrained implied volatility function."
Implying the Conditional Payo¤
Equation ( Given our empirical estimates of the daily set of state prices, our actual observations of the CDX price, and a structural model of the conditional payo¤, we can calibrate the model parameters D At ; a ; " to match the CDX spread on each day. To …nd a unique solution, we impose the two additional constraints on the average …rm beta and correlation described above. In particular,
we require that the model implied equity beta and pairwise correlation match their empirical counterparts. We estimate the average pairwise equity correlation, , for the constituents of the CDX over the period 2003 to 2007 to be 0:2 and the average equity beta, , to be one. This is not surprising since the CDX is comprised of investment grade securities issued by some of the largest U.S. corporations.
Our baseline payo¤ speci…cation for the risky debt portfolio, (11), relies on the Merton model recovery rate, which has a strong procyclicality. One potential concern is that this procyclicality in recovery rates implies too much impairment in bad economic states, which will overstate the required risk compensation. To mitigate this concern, we also evaluate the model with an alternative recovery rate assumption. Speci…cally, we calculate expected payo¤s using the Merton model default probability and a simple state-independent mean recovery rate, R, of 40%: 21
With this assumption, the conditional payo¤ of the CDX goes to 0:40 as the market index goes to zero, whereas with the Merton model recovery assumption the conditional CDX payo¤ goes to zero 2 0 The constrained implied volatility function results in an average root mean squared percentage error across all securities of 3:20%. 2 1 The CDS-implied spread data we are using assumes a 40% recovery value which is also consistent with Altman (2006). We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use a 50% recovery rate.
as the market index loses all of its value. An advantage of this approach is that, because default is independent of …rm and market value, it o¤ers a conservative, downward-biased estimate of the amount of systematic risk in the underlying bonds.
We then perform daily calibrations of the …rm parameters, D At ; a ; " , under the four models that obtain from our two parametric implied volatility speci…cations and our two recovery rate assumptions. This results in a time series of the underlying …rm parameters and implied measures of default probability and recovery rates under the pricing measure. Summary statistics of these parameters and implied values are reported in Table 2 . Across all four model speci…cations, the mean parameter values are highly similar, as are the implied credit risk measures. This suggests that the speci…c parametric assumptions about the state price density and the expected payo¤ function in the deep out-of-the-money states are not pivotal to explaining the CDX spread. Moreover, the parameters exhibit little time series variation, suggesting that the parameters themselves are quite stable through time.
Evaluating the Bond Pricing Model
Since the calibration procedure identi…es a triple of …rm parameters using three constraints, it enables the model to match the level of the CDX spread on each day in our sample. Therefore, in order to assess the model's ability to accurately characterize the priced risks of corporate bonds, Table 3 reports the output from these regressions. We calculate the model predicted change from time t to t+1 as the di¤erence between the model yield at time t+1, using parameters calibrated at time t; and the model yield at time t. The model predicted change is highly statistically signi…cant with a large R 2 for all implementations of the model. In the baseline speci…cation (Model 1), the model predicted change has a t-statistic of 8:70 and an R 2 of 0:34.
We also examine the relation between spread changes and changes in the riskfree rate, the S&P 500 index level, the 5-year at-the-money implied volatility, and the 5-year implied volatility skew. 
Pricing Credit Derivatives
The Merton (1974) credit model integrated with a common market factor, in the spirit of the CAPM, produces state-contingent payo¤s for bonds and bond portfolios. These security-level payo¤s are conditional on the realized market return, which allows for pricing via the market index option implied state prices. In other words, this pricing framework provides a direct link between the bond market and the equity index option market. The calibration procedure ensures consistency in price levels between the two markets and results in similar price dynamics, suggesting that these two markets are reasonably integrated. We now turn to the question of whether the prices of tranches issued on the bond portfolio are consistent with their market risks.
This uni…ed framework makes pricing credit derivatives simple. Having recovered the time series of model parameters (asset beta, leverage level, and idiosyncratic volatility) of the representative bond in the CDX, we can simulate state-contingent payo¤s for the CDX using (10). 22 Since the tranche (i.e. derivative) payo¤s are de…ned as a function of the payo¤ on the CDX (i.e. the underlying security), they can be identi…ed by simply applying the contract terms to each simulated outcome. In this case, each tranche's payo¤ is de…ned by its loss attachment points to the CDX payo¤. Finally, pricing is completed as before, by computing mean state-contingent payo¤s and applying the Arrow-Debreu prices.
The simulation of the state-contingent tranche payo¤s proceeds as follows. First, we specify a moneyness grid (i.e. possible market realizations in terms of gross return), ranging from 0 to 10 at increments of 0:005. Second, for each day in the sample, at each point along the grid, we make use of equation (10) and the calibrated …rm parameters to simulate the terminal values for each of the …rms in the CDX (N = 125), which determine the portfolio loss. The terms of each tranche are applied to the portfolio loss to calculate the various tranche payo¤s. We repeat this step 10; 000 times and then calculate the state-contingent mean payo¤ for each tranche, which is valued using that day's option-implied state prices. 23 The simulated state-contingent payo¤s for the CDX and the 7-10 tranche, and their associated state-contingent means, are displayed in Figure 4 . Table 4 presents a comparison of the spreads predicted by the models with the spreads o¤ered by each of the CDX tranches. In particular, for all implementations of the model, we report the 2 2 Model speci…cations in which the mean recovery value is state-independent require an additional assumption about the conditional distribution of the …rm-level loss. In particular, we assume the percentage loss given default for each issue comes from a beta distribution with mean of 60% (1-recovery rate) and standard deviation of 25%, based on empirical estimates of these values from Altman (2006). 2 3 A convenient approximation to the simulation procedure is to simply evaluate the tranche payo¤s at the expected state-contingent CDX payo¤, rather than computing their expectation as a function of the random, state-contingent CDX payo¤. Although this approach neglects the Jensen correction terms stemming from the non-linearity of the tranche payo¤ function, it is signi…cantly faster and results in empirically negligible errors. time series mean of the actual and model spreads and the correlation between weekly yields and changes in yields. The …rst-loss, or equity, tranche (0-3) has a higher mean spread than the model predicts, suggesting that this security has been undervalued in the market relative to our model. 24 Our model predicts considerably greater spreads than are present in the data for all of the other non-equity tranches. As a fraction of the spread, the disparity is most severe for the relatively senior 7-10 and 10-15 tranches. The 7-10 tranche spread predicted by our model exceeds actual spreads by more than a factor of three. For the 10-15 tranche our model predicts spreads that are four times as large as in the data. Figure 5 graphs the predicted and actual spreads through time. As can be seen, the model spreads exceed actual spreads across the entire sample for each of the non-equity tranches. On the other hand, correlations in weekly spread levels and changes between our model and observed spreads are uniformly large. This suggests that although their credit spread levels are o¤ by a large amount, the returns o¤ered by the model tranches and their actual counterparts are driven by common economic risks.
The formal Arrow-Debreu pricing approach assumes that markets are complete. In our setting, this translates into assuming that there is a continuum of options available with strike prices for all possible realizations of the market index. The replicating portfolio implicit in the formal model essentially takes positions in all of these securities. A simpler and highly feasible replicating strategy is to approximate the mean state-contingent tranche payo¤ with a portfolio comprised of a riskless bond and a buy-and-hold position in a single put spread on the market index (i.e. short an index put option with a relatively high strike price and long an index put option with a relative low strike price) with appropriately chosen strike prices. This replicating portfolio has two primary bene…ts. First, it relies only on two options rather than the continuum of options implicit in the model. Second, because this replicating strategy represents a static portfolio with no rebalancing for 6 months, it is attractive from an implementation perspective.
The challenge is to determine what index option strike prices should be used to replicate the market exposure for each tranche. While there are several ways to develop this approximation, we simply set the strike prices by matching the tranche attachment points to the expected CDX payo¤. For example, in order to …nd the strike prices of the puts corresponding to a tranche with a lower attachment point of X, and an upper attachment point of Y , we set (11) equal to 1 X, and solve for the log moneyness level, m . Conveniently, the exponential of the resulting log moneyness solution yields the strike price of the less out-of-the-money index put option (i.e. the option to short). To …nd the strike price of the more out-of-the money index put option (i.e. the option to go long), we repeat the computation setting the expected CDX payo¤ equal to 1 Y . Table 5 compares the actual spreads for each tranche to the market-risk-matched put spreads.
The results using the static put-spread approximations are very similar to those of the formal model. 25 Again, the replicating portfolios o¤er considerably larger yield spreads than those available 2 4 The conversion of the upfront spread to a running spread for the 0-3 tranche requires estimating the timing and magnitude of expected CDX losses, which is model speci…c. This causes the "actual" 0-3 tranche spread to vary across model speci…cations. 2 5 It turns out that the discrepancy between the formal model and the static market index put spread approximation from the non-equity CDO tranches. Moreover, the correlations between weekly changes of the actual credit spreads and the put spread approximate model are quite high. Taken together, it appears that senior CDX tranches have o¤ered too little compensation for the market risks to which they are exposed when compared to the compensation investors were able to earn in other markets for bearing similar market exposures.
Robustness
The empirical analysis in this paper rests on three key assumptions: (1) a single market factor explains all common movements in asset returns; (2) our sample of index options is su¢ cient to interpolate and extrapolate to all relevant state prices; and (3) the constituents of the CDX are su¢ ciently numerous and homogeneous to be accurately modeled by a representative …rm. This section will explore and discuss the robustness of our results to each of these assumptions.
Single-Factor
A concern with our approach -and with structural credit models in general -is that we rely on the equivalence between market and …rm-speci…c returns in terms of their relation to debt values.
That is, our analysis implicitly assumes that a 10 percent decline in a …rm's equity value has the same impact on its default likelihood regardless of whether this decline is …rm-speci…c or marketwide. This assumption may be problematic if factors such as sentiment or discount rate news have a strong in ‡uence on overall valuations but say nothing about a speci…c …rm's cash ‡ows and therefore its ability to repay its obligations. Of course, there are also reasons why market returns may be more informative than excess returns about a …rm's default likelihood. For instance, if delevering (e.g. selling assets) is more di¢ cult when many …rms are under …nancial pressure, a market-driven decline in …rm value may bode more poorly for bondholders than an equivalent, …rm-speci…c decline. is almost entirely due to the di¤erence in rebalancing frequencies.
Implied Volatility Extrapolation
The second key assumption of our paper is that our sample of …ve-year over-the-counter implied volatilities is su¢ cient to interpolate and extrapolate to all relevant state prices. In particular, our volatilities only cover the moneyness range of 0.7 to 1.3. Many of our tranches are highly exposed to states associated with moneyness levels that are well below 0.7. Therefore, to provide additional perspective on the likely shape of the 5-year implied volatility function for moneyness levels below 0:7 and to verify that our results are not an artifact of the OTC volatility prices we obtained,
we examined long-dated exchange-traded options on the S&P 500 index (SPX). Speci…cally, we identi…ed on each date the longest maturity SPX options and calculated their implied volatilities across all observed strike prices. These options are on average two and a half years to maturity and almost always include options with moneyness levels that are below 0:5, often as low as 0:4.
The exchange-traded options have volatility levels and skews that are highly similar to the …ve-year volatilities used in our analysis. More importantly, the exchange-traded options continue to exhibit a monotonic volatility skew for all moneyness levels below 1:0. Indeed, during our sample period, the skew below moneyness of 1:0 in exchange-traded implied volatilities was strictly downward sloping on every day.
We also examined a second, far more conservative implied volatility speci…cation which re- 
Homogeneity
A …nal assumption relied upon in our calibration exercise is that the dynamics of the 125 …rms in the CDX could be accurately captured by a single representative …rm. First, it is worth noting that our approach explains CDX movements with R 2 values that are at least as high as those elsewhere in the literature, suggesting that this assumption is not completely at odds with alternative approaches.
Second, and somewhat related to the single-factor assumption described above, a potentially important aspect of the cross section of underlying securities is within-industry return correlation.
To the extent that this represents a signi…cant source of co-movement, it could change the relative pricing of the equity and mezzanine tranches, as greater co-movement increases the likelihood of a mezzanine default. On the other hand, it is important to remember that industry co-movement will be, by design, orthogonal to market movements. And, because the CDX is well-diversi…ed pool across industries, even the default of an entire industry is unlikely to create portfolio losses in excess of the seven percent that is needed to impair the senior tranches. As a result, it is di¢ cult to see how the introduction of within-industry correlation can alter the risks faced by tranches with senior levels of subordination in a material way. Relatedly, some evidence on the importance of industry-level correlations comes from the May 2005 downgrade of GM and Ford, which clearly re ‡ected industry-level correlation in their respective cash ‡ows. This event ultimately led to an increase in mezzanine tranche prices and a downward reassessment of the importance of industry shocks. Equity tranche investors who hedged their positions by shorting the mezzanine tranches experienced signi…cant losses during this period as their models had overestimated the ability of an industry-level shock to wipe out the equity tranche and impair the mezzanine tranche.
Discussion
As we have shown in Section 1, theory predicts that securities with identical credit ratingsassessed on the basis of expected probabilities of default, or expected losses -can trade at di¤erent prices. In particular, creating large diversi…ed portfolios of economic assets (e.g. corporate bonds) and issuing prioritized capital structures of claims against those pools, as is common in structured …nance, emerges as a natural approach to manufacturing the cheapest security within a given credit rating category. When the underlying portfolios become asymptotically diversi…ed (N ! 1), the resulting claims concentrate the likelihood of default in the most adverse economic states, e¤ectively creating economic catastrophe bonds. In order to compensate investors for the systematic risk they are bearing, correctly priced ECBs o¤er the maximum possible yield spread per unit of default risk. To capture this bound, and more generally, the variation in compensation per unit of default risk, we introduce the credit risk ratio, =
Y ield Spread
Loss Rate . 26 While the yield spread re ‡ects both compensation for expected losses and risk premia arising from covariation of losses with economic outcomes, the loss rate is an annualized spread over the riskless rate necessary to compensate the investor for the risk of loss with no risk premium. 27 While inconsistent with the prices of market index options, the assumption of a lognormal distribution for the terminal market value is helpful for further assessing some of the model's implications and comparing estimated loss rates of the tranches to the rating-based bond indices.
In particular, with an explicit distribution of market states we can decompose credit spreads into compensation for expected loss and systematic risk. Therefore, to compute loss rates we make an auxiliary assumption that the terminal distribution of the market is lognormal, with a market risk premium, m , equal to 5% per year and volatility, m , given by the at-the-money 5-year option-implied volatility. This also allows us to calculate unconditional default probabilities and average values of for each of the securities. These values are reported in Table 6 .
The credit risk ratio re ‡ects the relative importance of the risk premium in the pricing of a defaultable bond, and is related to the average value of the marginal utility in states in which the bond is likely to default. For example, if a bond's defaults are idiosyncratic, the ratio is equal to one indicating that no additional risk premium is being attached to the timing of the defaults.
Conversely, the higher a security's propensity to experience losses in states with high marginal utility the higher the value of the ratio. Consistent with intuition and previous empirical …ndings, credit risk ratios are increasing in the seniority of the rating-based bond indices. 28 This indicates that the average economic state in which a highly rated bond defaults is worse than the average economic state in which a lower rated security is likely to default. Historically, the representative …rm included in the CDX index has had a credit rating of BBB or A. Our calibration produces results consistent with this …nding. The mean calibrated default intensity for the CDX is 31 bps, corresponding to a 5-year default probability of 1:54%, which is between that for A-rated (0:50%) and BBB-rated (2:08%) bonds, as reported in Cantor et al. (2005) . The credit risk ratio for the CDX averages 2:9, and is fairly stable through time, ranging from 2:3 to 3:3.
Recent structured …nance activity has created a new generation of products by pooling senior corporate claims (investment grade bonds in this paper), characterized by high initial values of , and issuing a capital structure of tranches against them. As a result of the tranching, the risk of default has been further concentrated into adverse economic states substantially increasing the appropriate risk compensation relative to rating-matched bonds. If investors fail to appreciate the impact of this mechanism on risk and continue to rely on their credit rating-to-price mapping deduced from single-name corporate bond markets, this new generation of securities will be signi…cantly mispriced. In particular, investors willing to sell default protection on the highest rated tranches will be o¤ered a yield insu¢ cient to compensate them for the systematic risk they are asked to bear. This can be seen vividly in Table 6 , where CDX tranches and single-name CDSs with similar loss rates, tend to trade at similar yields, despite their highly dissimilar economic risks, as evidenced by vastly di¤erent values. This suggests that the investors in senior tranches either do not appreciate the risks that they are being asked to bear, or are severely constrained by the institutional requirement to hold highly-rated securities. Figure 7 displays a scatter plot of the time series average value of log for various securities against their model-implied loss rate, computed using their actual market yield spreads. The scattering of points sketch out a fairly smooth curve, which essentially represents the credit market's pricing function based on credit rating, proxied here by loss rate. It appears that the non-equity CDX tranches are on average being priced to have yield spreads in line with rating-matched alterna-tives. In fact, these tranches o¤er spreads that are slightly higher than rating-matched alternatives, and thus appear to be priced attractively to an investor using this benchmark. Figure 7 also plots the average log for the cheapest to supply security at each loss rate (i.e. the yield spreads associated with the digital market call options from Proposition 2). This curve represents a theoretical upper bound for log at each loss rate. Interestingly, the average values of log for the non-equity CDX tranches, computed using their model yield spreads, lie very close to this upper bound. This not only summarizes the earlier …ndings that the model yield spreads were much larger than the actual yield spreads for these securities, but suggests that these tranches were nearly optimally designed to be the cheapest securities to supply within their rating category. Moreover, since the values of the tranches sum to the value of the underlying portfolio, the overpricing of the non-equity tranches implies an underpricing of the …rst loss tranche. This can be seen in Figure 5 , where the model yield spread is always below the actual yield spread for the 0%-3% tranche; and in Figure   7 , where the mean actual for the 0%-3% tranche lies far above the model , and even above our theoretical upper bound.
Due to its focus on pricing, our model suggests a characterization of the equity tranche that is distinct from the conclusions o¤ered by agency theory and asymmetric information (DeMarzo (2005)). Although, in the presence of asymmetric information about the cash ‡ows of the underlying securities, the equity tranche is indeed very risky to the uninformed, its cash ‡ow risk is primarily of the idiosyncratic variety. In other words, because the equity tranche bears the …rst losses on the underlying portfolio, it is exposed primarily to diversi…able, idiosyncratic losses. The benign nature of the underlying risk -re ‡ected in its low equilibrium price -stands in marked contrast to the tranche's popular characterization as "toxic waste." Although issuers of structured products are often required to hold this tranche as a means of alleviating the asymmetric information problem emphasized by DeMarzo (2005), they are also likely to be overcharging clients for this seemingly dangerous service.
Finally, although the empirical focus of this paper is on CDOs comprised of investment grade credit default swaps, the underlying logic applies equally to any structured …nance product consisting of assets with positive exposures to economic states. Structured products involving mortgages (CMOs) and corporate loans (CLOs) are likely to share these characteristics. Ultimately, how much of the repricing that has recently occurred in these markets is accounted for by the considerations of this paper depends on the relative importance of errors made in assessing the unconditional default probabilities (i.e. credit ratings) of the underlying assets vis a vis their economic risk exposures.
Conclusion
This paper presents a framework for understanding the risk and pricing implications of structured …nance activities. We demonstrate that senior CDO tranches have signi…cantly di¤erent systematic risk exposures than their credit rating matched, single-name counterparts, and should therefore command di¤erent risk premia. Importantly, we highlight that the information credit rating agencies provide to their customers is inadequate for pricing. Forecasts of unconditional cash ‡ows (i.e. credit ratings) are insu¢ cient for determining the discount rate and therefore can create signi…cant mispricing in derivatives on bond portfolios.
In the spirit of Arrow-Debreu, we develop an intuitive state-contingent approach for the valuation of …xed income securities, which has the virtue of preserving economic intuition even when applied to complex derivatives. Our pricing strategy for collateralized debt obligation tranches is to identify packages of other investable securities that deliver identical payo¤s conditional on the market return. Projecting expected cash ‡ows into the market return space may be an e¤ective way to identify investable portfolios that replicate the systematic risk in other applications. Our analysis demonstrates that an Arrow-Debreu approach to pricing can be operationalized relatively easily.
Our pricing estimates suggest that investors in senior CDO tranches are grossly undercompensated for the highly systematic nature of the risks they bear. We demonstrate that an investor willing to assume the economic risks inherent in senior CDO tranches can, with equivalent economic exposure, earn roughly four to …ve times more risk compensation by writing out-of-the-money put spreads on the market. We argue that this discrepancy has much to do with the fact that credit rating agencies are willing to certify senior CDO tranches as "safe" when, from an asset pricing perspective, they are quite the opposite.
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: Let p X(p ;N ) D (s) denote the state-contingent tranche default probability, for a tranche whose unconditional default probability is p , and underlying asset pool is comprised of N bonds. Since we are considering a series of tranches with a …xed unconditional probability of default -under suitable regularity conditions allowing for interchange of integration and di¤erentiation -we have:
whereŝ is chosen such that the derivative inside the integral is positive (negative) for states worse (better) thanŝ. Noting that the expected state-contingent tranche payo¤ is given by 1 p
(s), we can di¤erentiate the pricing equation for the digital tranche, under the same regularity conditions imposed above, to obtain,
However, since s provides an ordering of economic states from worst to best, the value of q(s) (s) -i.e. the price of receiving a dollar in state s per unit of probability of observing that state -will be a monotonically declining function of s, so long as the marginal investor is risk averse. Using this property and the mean value theorem, we know there will be two values m and m, with m > m, for which the above equation can be re-expressed as,
Finally, from (A1), we know that the two integrals are equal in absolute value, with the …rst being positive and the second negative. If we denote the value of the …rst integral, , we immediately have:
Consequently, increasing the number of securities in the underlying asset pool, N , while adjusting the tranche attachment point X(p ; N ), such that the unconditional tranche default probability is …xed, causes the value of the digital tranche to decline monotonically.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the set of discount bonds with state-contingent default probabilities, p D (s), and unconditional default probability of p . The unconditional expected payo¤ for all such securities is, by the assumption of zero recovery in default, equal to 1 p . If we denote the time to maturity by , and the corresponding riskless rate of return by, r f , the price of each bond can be computed from,
where we have taken advantage of the fact that the state prices themselves sum to the price of a -period riskless bond, exp( r f ), and de…ned (s) to be equal to the ratio of the state's price to its probability, q(s) (s) . As in the previous proof, note that if the marginal investor is risk averse, (s) will be monotonically decreasing in s. Finally, since (p ; p D (s)), re ‡ects the average value of (s) in the states in which the bond defaults, it follows that the bond with the lowest price (i.e. largest yield spread), fails to pay on a set with measure p containing the worst economic states.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider a sequence of digital tranches, whose attachments points X(p ; N ), are set as a function of the number of securities in the underlying portfolio, N , to maintain the tranche's unconditional default probability …xed at p . As N ! 1, the state-contingent tranche payo¤ converges in probability, as follows,
wheres is the p -the percentile of the -period distribution of economic states, guaranteeing that the unconditional tranche default probability is p . If the cumulative distribution of economic states is denoted by (s), then the attachment point of the asymptotically diversi…ed tranche can be recovered from, X(p ; 1) = p D ( 1 (p ) ). Since the asymptotically diversi…ed tranche pays zero on a set with measure p containing the worst economic states, and one elsewhere, its payo¤ converges to the payo¤ of the cheapest asset to supply with that level of default risk.
B Computing State Prices
We consider two parametric forms for the implied volatility function when …tting the prices of …ve-year S&P 500 index options:
where x is the option moneyness, de…ned as the ratio of the option strike price to the prevailing -period futures price. These functional forms for the volatility skew have a variety of attractive features. First, they can generate an approximately linear skew for options whose strike prices are close to at-the-money, matching the stylized facts for long-dated options. Second, the functions are bounded above and below, allowing us to control the magnitude of the implied volatility outside of the domain of strike prices for which we observe option prices. This approach is more elegant than assuming a constant implied volatility outside the range of observable option prices (Shimko (1993) , Campa et al. (1997) ), since it avoids problems of non-di¤erentiability and ensures that prices are martingales. The solution proposed by Brown and Toft (1999) is most similar to ours. We require that (x; ) converge to one half of its at-the-money value, (1; ), as x ! 1. Finally, in order to preclude arbitrage opportunities, we require that the Arrow-Debreu prices implied by our implied volatility function be strictly positive for all moneyness values.
For the hyperbolic tangent speci…cations, the …rst and second derivatives of implied volatility function with respect to the option moneyness are given by:
The corresponding derivatives for the exponential implied volatility function are:
The remainder of the partial derivatives appearing in formula for the Arrow-Debreu state prices can be obtained by di¤erentiating the Black-Scholes formula with respect to its various parameters. Denoting the -period futures price at time t by F t; , we have,
where:
Substituting these expressions back into the formula for the Arrow-Debreu prices, yields a closedfrom representation for the state prices implied by our parametrization of the implied volatility function. This table reports the time series summary statistics of the daily calibrated parameters and model-implied default probabilities and recovery values for each of four variants of the bond pricing model applied to the daily CDX spread. The CDX series is the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade index of five-year credit default swaps. The model CDX spread is calibrated on each day to match the actual CDX spread. All four models assume a hyperbolic tangent implied volatility function. Models 1 and 3 are based on the Merton (1974) credit model recovery value. Models 2 and 4 assume state-independent recovery values of 40%. Models 3 and 4 constrain the daily maximum implied volatility to be equal to the maximum observed implied volatility from the daily cross section of five-year index option prices. The time series means of the three model parameters are referred to as the asset beta, debt-to-asset ratio, and idiosyncratic asset volatility. The model-implied five-year default probability and recovery rate are calculated under the pricing measure. The standard errors of the means are reported in parenthesis.
Model
Asset Beta The dependent variable is the weekly change in the CDX spread. The CDX series is the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade index of five-year credit default swaps. The model predicted change in the CDX yield spread, E[ΔY i ], is calculated as the difference between the model yield at time t+1, using parameters calibrated at time t, and the actual yield at time t, using one of four models. All four models assume a hyperbolic tangent implied volatility function. Models 1 and 3 are based on the Merton (1974) credit model recovery value. Models 2 and 4 assume stateindependent recovery values of 40%. Models 3 and 4 constrain the daily maximum implied volatility to be equal to the maximum observed implied volatility from the daily cross section of five-year index option prices. The five-year swap rate is denoted Rf. S&P refers to the log level of the S&P 500 index. Five-year at-the-money implied volatility from S&P 500 index options is denoted as 5yVol. Skew is the linear slope between the implied volatility of five-year 30% outof-the-money options and the implied volatility of five-year at-the-money options. The adjusted R-square is denoted R 2 , t-statistics are in parenthesis, and the number of observations are in square brackets. Tranches are denoted by their lower and upper percentage loss attachment points. The actual CDX tranche spreads correspond to various tranches referencing the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade index of five-year credit default swaps. The model-implied tranche payoffs are approximated using a put spread portfolio comprised of a riskless bond and two equity index put options. The approximating put spread portfolio is re-calibrated once every six months on the CDX initiation date. Correlations of model and actual spreads in levels and changes are computed using weekly time series. This table reports summary statistics of the calibrated model parameters for various credit market securities and the model implied credit risk premia. Rating group indices represent the five-year credit default swap spreads implied by spreads of corporate bonds with the associated credit rating. The CDX series is the Dow Jones CDX North America Investment Grade index of five-year credit default swaps. Tranches referencing the CDX are denoted by their lower and upper loss attachment points. The calibrated model parameters are the asset beta, debt-to-asset ratio, and idiosyncratic asset volatility. The model spread is computed using the calibrated model. The credit risk ratio, φ, is the model spread divided by the loss rate. Loss rate is the annualized yield spread that would be obtained by discounting the expected payoff, calculated with the assumption that the S&P 500 index is distributed lognormal, at the riskless rate. The modelimplied five-year default probability and recovery rate are calculated with the assumption that the S&P 500 index is distributed lognormal.
Security
Asset This figure displays the state-contingent payoff for a CDO tranche that pays one if the losses on the underlying portfolio are less than a pre-specified value, X, and pays zero otherwise (a digital tranche). The underlying portfolio is comprised of N identical assets, where N is either 10, 100, or 1,000. The leftmost panels display the CDX and 7%-10% CDX tranche payoffs using the baseline model specification, which relies on the Merton (1974) credit model recovery assumption. The panels depict the mean state-contingent payoffs (line) and a selection of simulated outcomes (dots). The rightmost panels display these same payoffs calculated with the assumption that recovery rates are state-independent, drawn from a beta distribution with a mean of 0.40 and a standard deviation of 0.25. This figure displays the time series average of the base 10 log of the credit risk ratio, φ, plotted against the time series average of the base 10 log of the model loss rate for a variety of credit securities. φ is calculated by dividing the yield spread by the loss rate. φ values for portfolios of single-name corporate credit securities are denoted by circles. The actual CDX tranche φs are denoted by squares and the model CDX tranche φs are denoted by stars. similar
